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Pot, politics and the press—reflections on cannabis law reform in
Western Australia
SIMON LENTON
National Drug Research Institute, Curtin University of Technology, Perth, Western Australia
Windows of opportunity for changing drug laws open infrequently and they often close without legislative change being affected. In
this paper the author, who has been intimately involved in the process, describes how evidence-based recommendations to
‘decriminalize’ cannabis have recently been progressed through public debate and the political process to become law in Western
Australia (WA). The Cannabis Control Bill 2003 passed the WA Parliament on 23 September. The Bill, the legislative backing
behind the Cannabis Infringement Notice (CIN) Scheme, came into effect on 22 March 2004. This made WA the fourth
Australian jurisdiction, after South Australia, the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory, to adopt a
prohibition with civil penalties scheme for minor cannabis offences. This paper describes some of the background to the scheme, the
process by which it has become law, the main provisions of the scheme and its evaluation. It includes reflections on the role of
politics and the press in the process. The process of implementation and evaluation are outlined by the author, foreshadowing an
ongoing opportunity to understand the impact of the change in legislation.
GUEST EDITOR: RICHARD MATTICK
General comments on research and drug policy
Those committed to evidence-based drug policy need
to operate with a long-term timescale. They cannot be
concerned by a short-term lack of political support for
implementing policy based on research findings, but
they need to recognize that opportunities for policy
change come and go, and they need to be ready to feed
research findings into the policy process, both directly
and through the media.
Unlike treatment research, which has a clear audi-
ence of potent ‘agents of action’ in the form of
treatment service providers, the agents for implement-
ing drug policy research (policy makers, legislators,
politicians) are far less accessible. Typically, they are
not seekers of research findings, they have limited
expertise in how to read such findings and they are not,
by their nature, ‘research practitioners’. Furthermore,
the levers of policy change, which research findings
might be able to influence, are difficult to pull, and are
subject to many other competing forces, not least of
which is the political process. Implementation of policy
change is rarely a smooth incline of improvement, but
rather hills and dales and long plains, where seemingly
very little improvement happens. As a result, the impact
of research on drug policy needs to be evaluated over a
long time period.
Drug policy research operates in the political realm.
It will be of no surprise to anyone that, in a democracy,
politicians become concerned about how their deci-
sions and actions are viewed by potential voters at the
next election. However, while being dependent on
public support many aspire to public service—to
making a difference. This often requires longevity in
government and/or great industry, particularly where
there is a good risk of their tenure in government being
foreshortened. Another thing, which had not been well
understood by this author some years ago, is that
politicians see ‘evidence’ as only part of the issue.
Politics is about perceptions—a point reiterated to the
author by politicians from each side of the political
spectrum during the recent cannabis law debate in WA.
The reality for drug policy researchers is that, at best,
their research will be used by politicians to support their
arguments when the research findings are consistent
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with them, and will be ignored or criticized when the
research suggests a contrary policy position.
Drug policy debates in the public realm are often
polarized, due both to the nature of party politics and
the role of actors at the extreme policy positions who
one could caricature as ‘rabid legalizers and puritanical
prohibitionists’. Unsurprisingly the media, which typi-
cally feeds on controversy, often seeks to emphasize this
polarization in reporting drug policy issues. Clearly, this
is one major downside of disseminating research
findings through the media. There are other ways of
influencing policy such as publication in academic
journals and reports, making submissions, briefings and
direct involvement in policy development and imple-
mentation through working parties and so forth.
However, using the media is an important part of
disseminating drug policy research in an attempt to
make drug policy more evidence-based. In order to
contribute evidence to the drug policy debate in the
public realm, one first needs to get into the debate. All
politicians and their advisers read newspapers; very few
read research reports and scientific papers in refereed
journals. There is no point in conducting policy
research if no one who can make a difference knows
about it or reads it. While many politicians will tend to
ignore research that is not consistent with their own
policy position, once research findings are in the media
they might be disputed or derided, but they are harder
to ignore. Thus, drug policy researchers need to be
‘media-savvy’. This means understanding how the
media works, acquiring media training and being
available and prepared to communicate clearly research
findings in a way that is usable by the media.
Windows of opportunity for drug policy change
Kingdon (1984), cited in DiChiara & Galliher [1],
noted that policy windows, which are the opportunities
for action on given policy initiatives, open infrequently,
and when they open they rarely stay open for long. He
argued that many changes in public policy result from
the appearance of these opportunities, despite their
rarity (p. 43).
Drug law reforms can be de jure, involving changes to
the legal statutes themselves, or de facto, where the laws
remain unchanged but the way the law is enforced by
police is altered by administrative instructions. Prohibi-
tion with civil penalties schemes are examples of de jure
reforms, while prohibition with cautioning and/or
diversion schemes are examples of de facto reforms.
Reflecting on the flurry of cannabis ‘decriminalization’
in the United States during the 1970s when 11 states
introduced such laws, DiChiara & Galliher noted that
the narrow and tenuous policy window was limited and
the viability of the ‘decriminalization’ policy was quickly
supplanted by ‘de facto decriminalization’, suggesting
that explanations about whether such legislative
changes occur need to consider ‘the national mood,
political leadership, concerns of interest groups, espe-
cially law enforcement and drug users, as well as public
opinion’ [1, p. 44].
DiChiara & Galliher argued that this contrasted with
the demise of alcohol prohibition, where legal controls
were placed on manufacture and distribution, but not
on possession, and thus public use of alcohol in
‘speakeasies’ abounded, broadcasting the failure of
prohibition policy. However, under cannabis prohibi-
tion both possession and use were prohibited and
consumption took place largely in private, mostly by the
young. Consequently, they argue, the failure of
cannabis prohibition policy has been less publicly
evident, allowing officials to persist in the illusion of
the efficacy of such controls, even in the face of survey
data showing widespread use. Furthermore, as canna-
bis was used largely by the young, it could be dismissed
as the product of immaturity and youthful indiscretion
[1, p. 71]. Similarly, in Canada, research suggested that
a trend toward greater leniency in sentencing, a de facto
reform, could remove some of the impetus for de jure
cannabis law reform [2].
The West Australian example is interesting, in that de
jure reforms have been enacted in a climate where, like
most other Australian states (see Fig. 1), WA had ‘de
facto decriminalization’ in the form of prohibition with
cautioning and diversion to treatment for minor
cannabis offences.
Necessary conditions for a successful scheme
Experience in drug policy research suggested some
conditions that could be seen as necessary for the
successful translation of a drug law reform scheme into
de jure legislative change. These were that the legislative
change should be:
(1) Supported by a clear majority of the general public.
Research in criminology suggested that public
opinion was crucial in determining the effec-
tiveness of laws [3 – 5]. Additionally, moral
commitment to a particular law was one of the
most powerful predictors of whether individuals
would obey that law [6,7]. Australian research
had found when the terms were explained, there
was a high level (72 – 75%) of public support for
applying prohibition with civil penalties for
minor cannabis offences, but not so for legaliza-
tion (37 – 55%) [e.g. 8,9].
(2) Survivable for politicians. Those who are going to
support the passage of the policy changes into
law need to believe that to do this publicly will
not constitute electoral suicide when they have
to face the voters at the next election. Surveys
224 Simon Lenton
showing high levels of public support for
prohibition with civil penalties can have some
salience in this regard.
(3) Supported by law enforcement. It is important that
the police department, who are required to
enforce the law, support proposed legislative
changes. While there may be individual officers
who, like other members of the community,
have a range of views on such matters, it is
crucial that as an organization, police believe the
laws are of sound intent and are workable and
efficient from a practical, operational point of
view. The experience in South Australia was
that the way police implemented the scheme
was critical to its effectiveness. Thus, the ease
with which notices could be issued by police
appeared to contribute to a significant increase
in the number of people issued notices. This so-
called net-widening increased the numbers at
risk of criminal sanction for non-payment of
fines, which had the unintended consequence of
particularly disadvantaging those of limited
financial means [10].
(4) Supported by cannabis users. While many canna-
bis users will support full legalisation of
cannabis use [e.g. 11], the vast majority of users
will see civil penalties schemes as far more
reasonable and just than schemes that apply
strict criminal penalties.
(5) Supported by the evidence. Like any drug,
cannabis has the capacity to cause harm.
However, its major health risks are likely to be
among long-term, regular users [12]. Research
indicates that most people who receive a
criminal conviction for a minor cannabis
offence are otherwise law-abiding [13]. A
cannabis conviction can have significant adverse
impacts on employment, further involvement
with the criminal justice system, relationships
and accommodation; however, conviction fails
to deter future cannabis use by many of those
apprehended [14,15]. The social costs of a
cannabis conviction are far greater than those
under a civil penalties system where infringe-
ment penalties apply [16] but it appears that
criminal rather than a civil penalty may be more
likely to erode offenders’ attitudes toward police
[16]. Research has failed to show that removing
criminal penalties for personal use has led to an
increase in the number of regular cannabis users
in the general community [17 – 20]. However,
prohibition with civil penalty schemes have been
found to be far less expensive on the public
purse than strict criminal penalty schemes in
terms of criminal justice resources [21,22]. The
effectiveness of prohibition with civil penalties
schemes depends to a great extent on the detail
of how they are implemented. The SA scheme
has been shown to have a low rate (45%) of
people paying their fines by the due date
[10,23], and there was reasonable evidence that
organized crime had been syndicating cannabis
cultivation under the expiable plant limit [24].
However, such problems can be addressed and,
despite them, research suggests that overall
neither the SA general public nor the police
and the judiciary wanted to return to a criminal
penalty scheme [25,26].
Figure 1. Key features of current schemes for minor cannabis offences by jurisdiction. *As at December 2003.
Pot, politics and the press 225
(6) Sustainable under the international drug treaties
and conventions. While some would argue
otherwise, in this author’s view any proposed
model should be consistent with generally
accepted interpretations of the international
drug treaties and conventions. As a signatory
to the three main conventions Australia is
bound to have systems in place that prohibit
the availability of certain drugs. While inter-
pretations of these laws differ, most commenta-
tors [e.g. 27] agree that prohibition with civil
penalty systems such as those in place for
cannabis in 11 US states and SA, the ACT
and NT are not in breach of the treaties. Also
consistent with the treaties are de facto schemes
such as prohibition with cautioning that operate
in the other Australian jurisdictions and prohi-
bition with an expediency principle schemes
that operate for cannabis in Belgium, Germany,
Denmark and the Netherlands [28]. The latter
are consistent because the drug offences remain
illegal on the statute, even though cases invol-
ving defined small quantities are not investi-
gated or prosecuted by police.
(7) Subject to evaluation and review. Any recom-
mended scheme should be capable of being
evaluated and subject to regular review and
adjustment to increase the likelihood that it
meets the goals that it was designed to achieve.
About cannabis—health effects and prevalence of
use
Cannabis is the most widely used illicit drug in
Australia, in many other Western countries, and
probably world-wide [29 – 31]. It has been tried by
many young adults in most European countries and by
most young adults in Australia and the United States
[29,32,33]. Like other drugs, it has the capacity to
cause harm [30,34 – 36]. While most cannabis use is
experimental and intermittent, the major health risks
are more likely to be experienced among those using
the drug regularly (daily or near daily) over several years
or more [30]. The major public health burden
associated with cannabis is likely to be associated
morbidity rather than mortality, and at current popula-
tion use rates the public health burden is probably low,
and far less than that associated with alcohol or tobacco
[33,37]. However, as the prevalence of heavy cannabis
use increases and the age of initiation declines this
burden is likely to increase [37,38].
Widespread cannabis use continues, despite the
health risks of use and its almost ubiquitous prohibi-
tion. The question remains therefore as to what kind of
legislative system will produce the least harm in the
community from the use of the drug directly, and the
harms that stem from the system of regulation itself? At
least six main legislative options had been identified
including: total prohibition, legislative prohibition with
an expediency principle; prohibition with civil penal-
ties; partial prohibition; regulation; and free availability
[39].
Background to the WA scheme
Some policy windows close and others open
In May 1999 NDRI published a monograph entitled
The Regulation of Cannabis Possession, Use and Supply for
the Drugs and Crime Prevention Committee of the
Parliament of Victoria [40]. The report summarized the
Australian and international literature on legislative
options for cannabis and made recommendations as to
the most viable and appropriate options for Victoria.
The recommended model was one of prohibition with
civil penalties which incorporated cautioning. However,
while the report was being considered, an election was
called by the Liberal Government and the process of
cannabis policy review in Victoria was put on hold.
It was not until November 1999 that the new
Victorian Labor Government appointed a Drug Policy
Expert Committee, chaired by Professor David
Penington, who had also headed the previous Govern-
ment’s Premier’s Drug Advisory Council. Unfortu-
nately, by the time the NDRI report was finally
approved by the new government for release in April
2000, the Victorian cannabis reform policy window was
probably closing, if not already closed. The new
government appeared to go quiet on its drug law
reform agenda in the wake of two events. A community
consultation process on the proposed establishment of a
supervised injecting facility had led to a great deal of
community opposition that was extensively covered in
the media. Also, there was a great deal of concern about
the role of cannabis use in psychosis, following an
international conference in Melbourne in February
1999. Furthermore, there was little support for a civil
penalty scheme among senior Victorian police, who
were happy with the scheme of prohibition with
cautioning and diversion to treatment for minor
cannabis offences which they had implemented state-
wide in September 1998 after a trial in Broadmeadows
[41]. As previously in the United States, it appeared
that in Victoria the adoption of de facto decriminaliza-
tion to some extent undermined further de jure reform.
Similarly, the introduction of the Cannabis Caution-
ing and Mandatory Education System in WA, where
research had showed more than eight in 10 people
facing court on cannabis possession received a criminal
conviction [13], could be construed in part as an
attempt to take the wind out of calls to introduce
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cannabis law reform. In March 2000 the Liberal
Government introduced the Cannabis Cautioning and
Mandatory Education System across the state, after a
12-month trial in two police districts. The government
sold its introduction of the pilot of the cautioning
scheme as not being ‘soft on drugs’ because it was a
change in the way cannabis law was enforced, without
changing legislation itself [42]. The relevant Minister
stated ‘we will not decriminalize cannabis’ [43].
Attempting to be consistent with the government’s
‘tough on drugs’ position, the primary aim of the WA
cannabis cautioning scheme was to reduce the cannabis
use of those detected and as such it aimed to ‘net’ as
many cannabis users as possible [44]. Under this de
facto reform first offenders apprehended with less than
25 g of cannabis or a used smoking implement could be
given a formal caution for their first offence if they
attended an approved cannabis education session. A
caution could be given only to people with no prior
convictions for drugs or crimes of violence.
However, while policy windows for de jure reform in
WA and Victoria seemed to be closing in the face of de
facto reforms and other factors, other policy windows
were opening. One of these was that in 2000 the
Western Australian branch of the Australian Labor
Party (ALP), who at that time did not hold government,
were formulating their drugs policy in preparation for
an election the following year. Copies of the Victorian
Monograph were made available to them to assist in
this process. The following excerpt from their policy
statement reflects influence of the results of the
research on cannabis legislative options.
Given the prevalence of cannabis use throughout the
community, and given that criminalizing its use
apparently fails to provide any real deterrence, the
adverse effects of continuing with this policy needs to
be given serious consideration. If criminal penalties
do not act as a deterrent but do have a range of
negative effects, and if the community does not wish
to have the personal use of cannabis legalised, the
options of the civil penalty, or expanding the current
Government’s cautioning system, may be acceptable
and logical alternatives.
We propose a decriminalized regime which would
apply to possession of 50 grams of cannabis or less
and cultivation of no more than two plants per
household. A person who admitted to a simple
cannabis offence would be issued with a cautioning
notice as a first offence, be required to attend an
education and counselling session for a second
offence or, in lieu of accepting that option, face a
fine as civil offence, and be fined for any subsequent
offence. Possession and cultivation of cannabis
would not be legalised [45].
In February 2001, the ALP was elected to govern-
ment in WA with this policy platform which included
the intention to hold a Community Drug Summit and
to ‘decriminalize’ cannabis. This happened despite the
Liberal Party attempting to use the drug policy issue as
an election winner. The Liberals placed a full-page
advertisement in the newspaper the day prior to the
election, which was the last day on which election
advertising was allowed. The advertisement headed
‘Voter Drugs Warning’ stated:
Avoid the real risk of having Labor implement their
plans to allow people to grow commercially viable
quantities of marijuana in their home gardens and
make heroin freely available to addicts. . . If Labor
gets enough preferences and wins government they
will implement all their plans to make drugs more
available to more West Australian children and
adults [46].
The WA Community Drug Summit
The new Government promoted their Community
Drug Summit and approach to drugs as ‘evidence-
based’ and through some of the processes before and
during the Summit there was an opportunity to feed in
research findings and literature reviews on legislative
options for cannabis [47,48]. The WA Community
Drug Summit was held on 13 – 17 August 2001. Unlike
drug summits held elsewhere in Australia, the majority
of delegates to the WA Community Drug Summit were
members of the public. Consistent with some of the
practices used for citizen juries it was decided to
advertise for the 100 delegates. There were 80 delegate
places from the general community and 20 places for
people involved in illicit drug-related policy, service
delivery or research. The summit’s delegates and
invited speakers represented the full spectrum of
opinions on drug policy. Overall, the summit was
viewed as positive by many stakeholders. It provided a
neutral ground for consideration of the issues and
contributed to a balanced public debate where media
reportage was more sophisticated and comprehensive
than the often sensationalist treatment given to drug
issues. The Summit concluded with 45 recommenda-
tions that were endorsed by the majority of delegates.
This provided a useful public mandate to pursue some
politically contentious policies, the first of these being
cannabis law reform. The relevant recommendation
passed by the 100 Summit delegates (72 for, 27 against,
and 1 abstention) was:
Recommendation 39
For adults who possess and cultivate small amounts
of cannabis the government should adopt legislation
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that is consistent with prohibition with civil penalties,
with the option for cautioning and diversion.
This should also address:
. Education for the public re the health risks of
cannabis and the laws that apply to the drug.
. The evaluation and monitoring of the impact of
this legislation on patterns of use, harms and the
drug market.
. The re-affirmation of relevant responsibilities and
legislation re preventing intoxication while driv-
ing, or operating machinery [49].
On 27 November 2001, the government released its
response to the recommendations of the Drug Summit
[50]. It accepted all but one (dealing with a supervised
injecting facility) of the 45 recommendations. In
addressing the cannabis recommendation in his media
release the Premier of WA stated:
While the use of cannabis should not be condoned or
encouraged, the Government accepts the view of the
Community Drug Summit that small-time users
should not carry the stigma of a criminal conviction
for the rest of their lives. The possession of small
quantities of cannabis for personal use will remain an
offence and will continue to attract a fine but
offenders will not receive a criminal record [51].
Ministerial Working Party on Drug Law Reform
The government set up a Ministerial Working Party on
Drug Law Reform to provide advice on how the
recommended cannabis and other drug law reforms
could be implemented. The eight-member Working
Party is chaired by a WA Law Society representative
and includes representatives of the WA Police Service,
a justice official, a medical practitioner, a representative
from the new Drug and Alcohol Office and the author
as the drug researcher appointed. The Working Party
presented its report [52] to the Minister of Health at the
end of March 2002, after which it was considered by
Cabinet. On 25 May 2002 the report was released to
the public.
Main features of the scheme
The government endorsed all the recommendations in
the report for a scheme of prohibition with civil
penalties for minor cannabis offences, but excluded
hydroponic cultivation of cannabis plants from the
infringement notice scheme and included possession of
a used smoking implement as an offence under the
scheme. The Cannabis Control Bill 2003 was intro-
duced into the WA Parliament on March 20 2003 and
the amended Bill passed both Houses of Parliament on
23 September. While during its passage through
Parliament there were a number of other amendments
to the Bill which clarified the wording of clauses
consistent with the intention of the scheme as laid out
in the Working Party’s report, there was only one
amendment (described below) which constituted an-
other substantial change to the structure of the scheme.
Compared to similar schemes elsewhere in Australia
(see Figs 1 and 2), the amounts eligible for a notice in
the CIN scheme are comparatively low and the fines
comparatively high. The scheme differs from other
Australian prohibition with civil penalties schemes in a
number of ways. Unlike the SA scheme it: (1) provides
support for police to charge people they believe are
trying to flout the intentions of the scheme by using the
infringement levels as a cover for dealing activities; and
(2) limits the number of plants eligible for an
infringement notice to two per household, to deter
collective growing. In an innovation the WA scheme
regulates sellers of smoking paraphernalia and hydro-
ponics equipment.
The WA scheme aims to deal with the low expiation
rates found in SA in two ways. First, those eligible for
an infringement notice must supply evidence as to their
identity (e.g. driver’s licence) to facilitate follow-up of
fine defaulters. Secondly, those given a notice will have
the option to pay their penalty in full within 28 days, or
complete a specified cannabis education session within
the same period. The education option ought to be
attractive to those of limited financial means, who
appear to be a large proportion of those who fail to pay
their fines in the SA scheme.
During the parliamentary debate an amendment was
moved by the Liberal opposition to the effect that, if an
individual had two notices within 10 years, then they
should receive a criminal conviction. In response to
this, an amendment was moved and passed with the
support of Labor and the Greens, so that people
receiving more than three notices in a 3-year period
would not have the option of paying a fine to expiate the
offence. Rather, they would be required to attend a
specified cannabis education session or receive a
criminal charge. Repeat offenders, who are often
dependent on the drug, are more likely to respond to
education and contact with a treatment service than
they are to a criminal conviction.
Unlike the cannabis cautioning schemes currently in
place in five Australian jurisdictions, the WA scheme
aims to address the supply side of the cannabis market
by moving cannabis supply away from large-scale,
criminal suppliers by making cultivation of up to two
non-hydro plants eligible for a notice. While some 90%
of Australian users say they obtain their cannabis from
‘friends’ or relatives [53], in-depth studies of cannabis
users apprehended for the first time find only a third
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claim they grow their own as their main source of
supply [54,55]. There is considerable evidence of the
involvement of criminal elements in large-scale canna-
bis supply in Australia [12]. This has been associated
with an overlap of the cannabis market with that for
more harmful drugs and additional risks to the wider
community due to measures used to protect crops and
avoid detection [12].
Figure 2. Overview of the WA Cannabis Infringement Notice Scheme.
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In recognition of the limits of criminal law in
deterring cannabis use, the government has committed
to a comprehensive education campaign targeted at the
general public, young people and cannabis users about
the harms associated with use of the drug and the laws
that apply to it. The changes to cannabis law
exemplified in the Bill and the accompanying initiatives
are summarized in Figure 2.
Politics, the process and the media
The following reflections on the politics, the processes
of the legislative change and the role of the media
attempt may help explain the constellation of factors
which led to this de jure reform despite the recent de
facto changes.
Politics
First, from a political point of view, the Labor Party had
a mandate to introduce prohibition with civil penalties for
minor cannabis offences when the policy was strongly
supported at the Community Drug Summit after they
won the election on a platform that explicitly included
cannabis ‘decriminalization’.
Both the government and the Liberal Opposition
became aware of the research that many in the
community confused the term ‘decriminalization’ with
‘legalization’. As a result, while the government
subsequently avoided using the term, and emphasized
that cannabis use and cultivation would remain illegal
under the proposed scheme [e.g. 56], the Opposition
frequently used ‘decriminalization’ and said that the
government scheme would ‘allow’ possession and
cultivation of cannabis [e.g. 57].
From before the release of the Working Party’s report
the Liberal Opposition attempted to make political
mileage out of the issue. The Opposition leader and his
drugs spokesperson conducted a media launch where
they were photographed with 8 kg of bagged lawn
clippings, which they claimed represented the amount
of cannabis that could be grown in 1 year by two
hydroponic plants [58]. The government subsequently
excluded hydroponic cultivation from the scheme. Over
the months of the parliamentary debate on the Bill,
such tactics continued.
When the Bill was introduced into the lower house
the Opposition Leader brought 30 1 g bags of what
turned out to be dried parsley into Parliament and
caused considerable uproar [59]. The Liberals failed
to mention that under their own cautioning scheme,
someone with 25 g of cannabis could have received a
caution for a first offence. The Liberal Party also
brought to Perth a social worker from Lambeth in
the United Kingdom and arranged media and public
events by her in an attempt to link problems with the
informal police warning scheme with the proposed
prohibition with civil penalties scheme [60,61]. In the
Upper House debate they called for all MPs to be
drug-tested prior to the vote [62]. The Opposition
leader vowed to make cannabis the defining issue of
the next election, but a rally against the government’s
cannabis reforms, that had been extensively promoted
by a popular radio talkback host and was held on a
stormy day on the steps of Parliament House,
attracted fewer than 50 members of the public
[60]. Particularly in the Upper House, where they
held the balance of power, the Greens played a
crucial role in supporting the government’s reforms
and in important amendments such as those regard-
ing the requirements regarding sellers of hydroponic
equipment.
The Ministerial Working Party on Drug Law reform
had been established by the Health Minister, Bob
Kucera, a former policeman who with that back-
ground brought considerable credibility to the law
reform issue. Also responsible for the Drug Summit,
and the management of the cannabis Bill through the
Lower House of Parliament, there was some concern
when he lost the health portfolio in a cabinet reshuffle
at the end of June 2003. He was replaced by the
Attorney General, Jim McGinty, who in also being
given the health portfolio saw the Bill though the
remainder of the parliamentary process, while tackling
the major tasks of responding to public concerns
about health budget overruns and hospital waiting lists
prior to the next state election, due to be held by
February 2005. While there has been no suggestion
that the former Minister’s performance on the
cannabis issue contributed to the change in portfolio,
the new Minister, substantially engaged in other
matters, has not championed the drug issue as did
his predecessor.
The process
The process of getting the proposed changes into law
was a long one. The fact that after long hours of robust
debate the working group was able to come to a
consensus and develop a coherent set of practical,
evidence-based policy recommendations within its
timeline of 6 months is a testament to the industry
and commitment of the members. Of necessity the
proposed scheme was a compromise, and this is one of
its key strengths as it has the support of the police,
health, justice, legal and research stakeholders. Then
the process of getting an endorsement by cabinet,
having the Parliamentary Council draft the Bill, an
iterative process itself, and then it being tabled and
making its way through both Houses of Parliament and
into law was one which involved even more work and
good will from a host of people behind the scene. On
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reflection, the joint contribution and calibre of people
within government and its bureaucracy, and outside
them, was a necessary condition for the successful
passing of the legislative change by government.
Similarly, while the press and public scrutiny of the
reforms was robust and relentless, the process of
parliamentary debate at times ponderous and disheart-
ening, and the political deal-making and compromise at
times frustrating, the resulting scheme has remained
intact and evidence-based through it all. The evidence
base of the scheme was a major strength. Both sides of
politics were briefed on the scheme and the evidence
behind it, and the data were conveyed to the public in
working papers, press articles and interviews and in
published letters to the Editor in both the daily and
community newspapers.
The media
It was clear that most of the major media outlets saw
themselves as having a key role in informing the public
about arguments on all sides of the cannabis reform
debate. As a result, despite the prevailing hunger for
controversy, throughout most of the process most of the
coverage in the press and electronic media was
balanced and well informed, continuing the tradition
that had been commenced with the media coverage
during the Community Drug Summit. Journalists were
open to detailed briefings about the background to the
reforms. Interest groups such as the Coalition Against
Drugs and the Australian Drug Law Reform Founda-
tion were regular contributors to the debate though the
electronic and print media, in particular through letters
to the Editor. In the daily newspaper a small number of
core reporters stayed with the story throughout,
providing a depth of coverage that certainly contributed
to an informed community debate. While a change in
the paper’s editorship found the reforms receiving
mixed editorial support, the quality of the reporting on
the issue elsewhere allowed the research evidence to
continue to have an impact on the public debate on the
reforms.
Implementation issues
Between passing of the laws and their proclamation on
22 March 2004 the work continued in development of
the regulations, protocols and training supporting the
implementation by police and the education schemes
for the general public, young people, cannabis users
and health and welfare professionals. The research
evidence suggests strongly that the extent to which the
scheme is a success will depend largely on how the
scheme is implemented by police and the impact of
the public education and non-legislative components
of the scheme. Despite this, the Ministerial Working
Party had only limited capacity, as a body, to
contribute to and monitor these processes, although
as individuals, many members of the Working Party
were involved in implementing various of these
elements within their own departments.
Evaluation
The NDRI and The Crime Research Centre at the
University of WA were successful in receiving initial
funding from the National Drug Law Enforcement
Research Fund (NDLERF) for the first year of a 3-year
project to evaluate the impact on cannabis use and
related harm of changes to cannabis law in WA. The
project is innovative, as it is an a priori pre – post
evaluation of change from prohibition with cautioning
to prohibition with civil penalties. Most previous
research, including that presented in this paper, has
been post-facto and employed retrospective evaluations.
The study consists of seven substudies, four of which
will entail data collection before, and 18 months after,
the proposed changes are implemented. This timeframe
should allow for lags in implementing components of
the proposed changes and the bedding down of these.
Importantly, the new research includes three do-
mains not well addressed in the earlier research
including a sample of regular (at least weekly) cannabis
users who are likely to be the group whose use is most
likely to be affected by any change in the law; impacts
on the drug market, including price, potency, avail-
ability, source (self-supply, dealer-supply, etc.); and the
impacts of legal changes for adult cannabis use on the
cannabis use and attitudes of school children.
Data collection for the first wave of the two wave
substudies is complete. The substudies address impacts
of the legislative changes on: (i) the general public:
cannabis use, attitudes, knowledge; (ii) frequent, at
least weekly, cannabis users: use, attitudes, knowledge;
(iii) the drug market: price, potency, availability, source
(self-supply, dealer-supply, etc.); (iv) apprehended
offenders: use, attitudes to the law and social impacts;
(v) law enforcement: trends in activity; attitudes and
practices; drug market perceptions; (vi) health effects:
drug treatment-seeking, serious road injuries, psychosis
and violence; and (vii) impacts on school students and
teachers regarding students’ use, attitudes and knowl-
edge and effects of the proposed changes on drug
education in the classroom. The NDRI evaluation will
complement monitoring of the scheme conducted by
the Drug and Alcohol Office of the WA Health
Department.
Concluding comments
The effectiveness of the Western Australian cannabis
law reforms and their implementation is yet to be
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determined. However, the process of reform has been
novel in that in contrast to the earlier North American
examples, legislative or de jure reform has not been
blocked by the adoption of de facto reforms. This paper
suggests some explanations for this. The majority of the
public were in favour of legislative change, and the
public dissemination of the results of the social impact
of a cannabis conviction contributed to making the
adverse consequences of strict prohibition publicly
evident. The policy window opened briefly when the
then Labor Opposition, with a commitment to evi-
dence-based drug policy, was reviewing its policy
platform prior to the election. In this they distinguished
themselves from the Liberal Government which had
made de facto reforms by introducing a cannabis
cautioning scheme, but pledged that they would not
make de jure changes. When Labor won the election
with a policy of cannabis ‘decriminalization’, they had a
perceived mandate for de jure reform, which was
reinforced by endorsement of the Community Drug
Summit. The establishment of the Ministerial Working
Party on Drug Law Reform brought together key
stakeholders from within and outside government who
had a commitment to evidence-based drug policy
reform and the capacity to design a scheme which was
practical and workable from an operational point of
view. Public statements of support from the highest
echelons of the WA Police Service was critical, as was
the fortitude of those parliamentarians who supported
the evidence-based scheme, despite the political risks.
Finally, the position that most of the media took in
wanting to contribute to an informed public debate
rather than simply sensationalize the issue was crucial.
It provided a setting for research evidence and the
progress of the law reforms to be considered by the
community while also allowing views across the
spectrum of opinion to be aired and considered by
the public, policy makers and legislators. It is yet to be
seen whether the media will continue to take this stance
as the scheme is implemented and the evaluation results
emerge.
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